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Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1I),
11 F.3D 170 (D.C. CIR. 1993).
Introduction
Petitioners, a group of broadcasters, authors, program suppliers, listeners, and
viewers challenged a Federal Communications Commission ban restricting broad-
casts of "indecent" material within the hours of 6 a.m. to midnight. The District
Court for the District of Columbia held that this ban violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Although the court conceded that the govern-
ment had a compelling interest in protecting children against indecent material,
the ban was not sufficiently narrow to achieve that interest.
Facts
Federal law has prohibited the broadcasting of "indecent" material since the
enactment of the Radio Act of 1927.1 Then, the concept of "indecent" was relat-
ed to "the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."2 Today, the FCC
defines "indecency" as "language or material that, in context, depicts or de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs."3
In Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT I"), the court struck down
the narrowing of the safe harbor period (hours during which broadcasting of
indecent material is permitted) to midnight through 6 a.m. The court based its
decision, in part, on the fact that the Commission had not explained its expansion
of the definition of "children" (whom the safe harbor rules are intended to pro-
tect) from below-12 years of age to include adolescents between 12 and 17 years
of age. Furthermore, the Commission had only estimated "the number of teens in
the total ... audience," without adducing any specific audience data for "specif-
ic ... stations" that allegedly placed children at risk of exposure to indecent
material.'
In Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT II),6 a 24-hour ban on
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1464. See Radio Act of 1927, Pub.L. No. 69-632, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162, 1172-73;
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735-38, (1978) (discussing statutory history of indecency
regulation).
2. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975), quoted in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32.
3. 1993 Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 704-5 Par. 4 n. 10.
4. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
5. Id. at 1341 (emphasis in original).
6. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, __ U.S. __. 112 S.Ct. 1281, 117 L.Ed.2d 507
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broadcasting of indecent material was struck down.7 The court in reaching its
decision interpreted ACT I as requiring that some safe harbor for broadcasting
indecent material be maintained, noting that even "Congress itself' could not
totally ban indecent speech.'
After the decision in ACT II, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of
19929, which required the Commission to ban the broadcast of indecent material
from 6 a.m. to midnight, but allow public broadcast stations that go off the air at
or before midnight an additional two hours (between 10 p.m. and midnight)
during which to broadcast such material. This appeal resulted.
The FCC ("FCC" or "Commission") set forth three goals to justify the 6 a.m.
to midnight ban: (i) "ensuring that parents have an opportunity to supervise their
children's listening and viewing of over-the-air broadcasts," (ii) "ensuring the
well being of minors" regardless of parental supervision, and (iii) protecting "the
right of all members of the public to be free of indecent material in the privacy
of their homes."'" The court rejected the third interest, protecting the general
public, as insufficient to support a restriction on the broadcasting of constitution-
ally protected "indecent" material. The court accepted as compelling the first two
interests in protecting the welfare of children but found that the ban was not
narrowly tailored to advance these interests and to meet constitutional standards.
Legal Analysis
The court began by noting that indecent speech is protected by the First
Amendment", and that government may "regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest."' 2
The government argued that the 6 a.m. to midnight ban promotes its
compelling interest in protecting the privacy of one's home, regardless of age.
Because of the inherently intrusive nature of broadcasting, the government sub-
mitted that it can restrict the broadcast of indecent material to the hours when
most people are asleep.
In response to the government's argument, the court held that there is no
generalized government interest in protecting adults from indecent speech, citing
the First Amendment principle "that debate on public issues should be uninhibit-
ed, robust, and wide-open."'3 The court noted that, excepting obscenity, "'[the
(1992).
7. Id. at 1510.
8. Id. at 1509.
9. Pub.L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949 ("Telecommunications Act").
10. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704,
705-706 Par. 10, 14 (1993) ("1993 Order").
11. See ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509; ACT!, 852 F.2d at 1340.
12. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, (1989). See Consolidated
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.. 447 U.S. 530, 540, (1980); ACT 1, 932 F.2d at
1509; ACT!, 852 F.2d at 1343 n. 18.
13. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270. (1964). Accord Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
[Vol. IV:321
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Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be
offensive to some does not justify its suppression. ' "1 4 The court added that a
captive audience rationale is inapplicable to indecent broadcasts, insofar as "the
radio [and television] can be turned off."'5 Since the asserted interest in protect-
ing adults does not apply when children are not in that audience, the court as-
sumed that the purpose of the ban is to protect only children. Therefore, the
generalized privacy rationale was rejected.
Next, the court addressed the interests relating to children that were advanced
by the Commission in support of the 6 a.m. to midnight ban: (i) an interest in
helping parents supervise their children, and (ii) an independent interest in
shielding children from exposure to indecent material regardless of parental
supervision. Although it acknowledged the compelling government interest in
protecting children, the court rejected the 6 a.m. to midnight ban as not narrowly
tailored to meet constitutional standards.
With respect to the government's interest in the protection of children, the
court held that where constitutionally protected speech is restricted, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance the
asserted compelling interest.16 This means that the government can "[c]hannel
[1" programming in order to "protect unsupervised children" but only so long as
it remains "sensitive to the First Amendment interests of broadcasters, adults,
and parents."'7 The court held that the means chosen by the government to ad-
vance its interest in the protection of children were not the least restrictive,
insofar as it did not properly weigh the First Amendment rights of viewers and
listeners.
The court noted that there was no evidence suggesting that the effectiveness
of parental supervision is related to time of day or night, or that the midnight to
6 a.m. safe harbor was tailored to assist parents in supervising their children's
viewing or listening. If the purpose of the ban is to assist parents in supervising
their children, a 3:00 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. safe harbor would be even more effec-
tive, as children are sure to be asleep.
In the alternative, the government argued that it has a compelling interest in
shielding all minors, regardless of age, from exposure to indecent material. The
court rejected this rationale, because "the grounds for restricting a minor's First
Amendment rights (here as listener or viewer) fade as the minor matures." "In
most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less
applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to
minors."' 9 Although children, unlike adults, may be unable to avoid harmful
485 U.S. 46, 55-56, (1988).
14. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71. (1983) (quoting Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701, (1977)).
15. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110, (1932) (unanimous). See Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302, (year) (plurality) (quoting same).
16. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-31; ACT II 932 F.2d at 1509; ACT 1, 852 F.2d at 1343-44.
17. ACT 1. 852 F.2d at 1340 & n. 12.
18. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
19. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214, (1975) (footnote and citations omitted).
19941
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speech, "the capacity for choice does not remain dormant throughout childhood
until appearing ex nihilo upon the arrival of a person's 18th birthday." Therefore,
the court concluded, the government must consider "the expanding First Amend-
ment interests of maturing minors" when suppressing constitutionally protected
material. As the government's interest in protecting children from indecent
speech varies in importance with age, "[t]he government must adduce data which
permits a more finely tuned trade-off between adults' First Amendment rights
[and this interest] . .. ."
Furthermore, the court found that there was no evidence that the 6 a.m. to
midnight ban was narrowly tailored to avoid infringement on the First Amend-
ment rights of adult listeners and viewers. The 6 a.m. "stretch[es] all but the
hours most listeners [and viewers-young and old alike-are asleep," and allows
adults to see and hear only material that is fit for children."
Conchsion
The court concluded that although there is a compelling government interest
in helping parents supervise their children and in protecting the well-being of
children, the FCC's ban on constitutionally protected indecent material during the
hours of 6 a.m. to midnight is not sufficiently narrow to advance these interests
without violating the First Amendment.
William M. Sweetnam
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, (1969); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 692 n. 14, (1977) (plurality) ("minors are entitled to constitutional protection for
freedom of speech" (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at in between U.S. at 503)).
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